Mr. President, we're taping this interview on Friday, and it's week eight of the Israeli–U.S. war in Iran. The world is on the brink, or already in the midst, of a fuel crisis. Did President Trump make a miscalculation?

Well, I think it was a war of choice. The United States and Israel went in together. Iran's counterattack has been ferocious, not only in the Gulf states but elsewhere as well. What we're seeing now is that conflicts are no longer only local. They are regional, and regional conflicts have global implications.

The closing of the Strait of Hormuz, which has been a collateral effect of what's going on, has caused an increase in energy prices — the price of oil — and therefore, by definition, inflation. This will hit fertilizer and food prices, more so in the region and in Asia than in Europe. That's why I have called for de-escalation and an end to the war as soon as possible.

What are the implications you are most worried about for our region?

At the beginning, I was particularly worried about Ukraine, because an increase in oil prices will feed the Russian war machine. I was also concerned about whether the U.S. was depleting its military stockpiles in the Middle East.

The silver lining, if I may say so, is that Ukraine has now been able to help Gulf states with air defense, especially drone defense. This has had a positive effect for Ukraine, which is now in a relatively strong position because it can also rely on support from the Gulf states, financially and otherwise.

Another possible escalatory factor, beyond the economy and the potential global recession — which would hit us hard — is terrorism. Iran has not yet used all the instruments in its bag yet. It could still launch terrorist attacks in Europe through its proxies. We need to be vigilant and awake.

Do you foresee, or even support, a scenario where European countries or NATO would participate in keeping the Strait of Hormuz open?

From the beginning, we have said that once there is a ceasefire and a peace agreement, we would be engaged. Initially, around 20 countries signed a statement. I later participated in a meeting with representatives from 50 countries — about a quarter of the world's nations — calling for the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and respect for freedom of navigation and the law of the sea.

I am sure that when we reach that stage, once the hot war is over, Finland will help in one way or another. Our contribution would likely be limited, but we have experience — for example, our officers have participated in Operation Atalanta in the Red Sea and elsewhere. So I'm sure we do have opportunities to help.

Obviously all this is diverting attention from Ukraine. How is Ukraine doing, in your view, and how are we, the collective West, doing in supporting it?

The first thing to say is that Ukraine is in a much better position this year than it was a year ago. Ukraine is inflicting considerably more damage on Russia than Russia is able to cause on Ukraine.

We work with three base-case scenarios: one, the war continues; two, there is a peace agreement; and three, one side — Russia or Ukraine — becomes significantly weakened. Right now, our base case is that the war will continue. So let's start preparing for next winter, especially in terms of energy.

I don't see a peace agreement coming. We were quite close at one point, but as we now know, Russia does not want peace. I also don't see Ukraine weakening. On the contrary, I see Russia weakening economically and militarily.

Just to give you facts: Russia advanced less than one percentage point of Ukrainian territory in 2025. Ukraine is now killing somewhere between 30,000 and 35,000 Russian soldiers per month. In March, Ukraine launched more missiles and drones into Russia than Russia launched into Ukraine.

The Russian military forces are corrupt, which causes big trouble, and Russia is not able to recruit as many soldiers onto the battlefield. All of this is a long way of saying that Ukraine is actually doing quite well.

Would it be better to have peace? Of course. But Russia doesn't want it, so we need to continue supporting Ukraine. The fact that the EU can now release €90 billion is good news for Ukraine. I'm quite optimistic about Ukraine's situation right now.

There was recently some spillover of war activities into both of our countries. Some Ukrainian drones aimed at Russian oil refineries or ports ended up in Finland and Estonia, among other places. It struck me that we seemed ill‑prepared for such a scenario. What lesson did you take away from that?

Probably two lessons. The first is that you can never be 100 percent prepared for drones. We see this between Ukraine and Russia: a certain number of drones will always get through. So yes, it is a wake‑up call — not that we haven't been alert already — that we need to work more and more on modern warfare.

In Finland, we are doing that. We have serious drone programs and serious cooperation under way, things I can't talk about yet. The second lesson is that resilience is between our ears. In other words, when something like this happens, it's a question of how we react as human beings. And I think all of us still have a lot to learn.

The Ukrainians have learned the hard way because they have hundreds of drones coming at them every day. But we also have to learn how to adapt to a new situation where different instruments of war can be sent in our direction, either deliberately or as collateral damage. In this case, it was collateral damage from a Ukrainian attack.

Almost everyone I spoke to while preparing for this interview said that Finland is "punching above its weight" in international relations, and many attribute this to your personality or charisma. You don't contest that?

It's difficult to answer that. We come from a small country, and we have experience with Russia, which is the main aggressor in the war against Ukraine. We are new members of NATO, we have one of the largest militaries in the alliance, and we are a security provider, not a security consumer. That gives us a position of strength in the current global situation.

We also have a very useful system. The President leads foreign policy together with the government and serves as Commander‑in‑Chief, while the government focuses more on the EU and domestic affairs. That gives me time. I can do shuttle diplomacy.

For example, in April, when we're recording this interview, I will spend only three days at home. If I were Prime Minister, I could never do that because I would be tied up with domestic issues. Of course, personality matters in foreign policy, but I give more credit to the system and to who we are as Finns than to myself personally.

If you don't mind my saying so, Finnish politicians have historically seemed a bit dry.

You mean Kekkonen was dry? (laughing) I don't think he was dry at all.

What I'm getting at is that people say you're very different in that respect. Does this come naturally to you, or did you have to learn it?

I think we're all prisoners of our own identity, and we can debate ad infinitum whether it's nature or nurture. I grew up in a very liberal, open, and international family. I come from a bilingual background: I spoke Swedish with my father and Finnish with my mother when she was alive. I've lived roughly a third of my life abroad, and that probably shaped who I am. But again, it's very difficult to psychoanalyze yourself. If I'm useful to Finland right now in this difficult situation, where we need to be present internationally, then I'm happy. But I didn't train myself to be this way. This is simply who I am.

You held many cabinet positions and eventually became Prime Minister. Your work as Foreign Minister is widely praised, but your time as Prime Minister received mixed reviews. Do you admit now that you were out of your depth?

"Out of my depth" is probably the wrong expression. I've always been interested in international relations, and I was never supposed to go into domestic politics. I entered politics relatively late, at 36. I remember a time in Estonian politics when 36 was considered extremely old.

I also wasn't supposed to become Prime Minister; it happened by default at a very difficult moment, one year before elections. The two years I spent as Prime Minister and Finance Minister, and as party leader, were very tough. But I wouldn't be who I am today without that experience.

Sometimes in life you need to be hit quite hard to realize what you actually have. To sum it up, I feel much more comfortable being President with responsibility for foreign affairs than I did as Prime Minister.

When you became Foreign Minister in 2008, you were thrown straight into the war in Georgia and participated in ending it quickly. Do you admit that Western politicians — including yourself — did not fully grasp the threat posed by Russia at the time?

We were probably not as Estonian as we should have been. But I did give a speech after returning from negotiating the Russia‑Georgia ceasefire together with the French. I presented it to our ambassadors in August 2008, and it was titled "08‑08‑08." In that speech, I said we were entering a new era of international relations in which Russian aggression would be part of the landscape, and that we needed to respond accordingly. I even called for reopening the discussion on NATO membership. That speech was heavily criticized in Finland.

Were we too soft? Yes. Were we too soft in 2014? Yes. But do I think we did the right response in 2022? Yes. So perhaps it's a case of "third time lucky," or better late than never.

You left politics for several years before becoming President and have said that you returned because of Putin. Could you explain?

I had no plans to return to politics. I felt I had done my service to the country: four years in the European Parliament and eight years in government. I was 50, and I went into banking at the European Investment Bank, and then into academia at the European University Institute in Florence, which I really love.

But when Russia attacked Ukraine, we began a conversation at home about whether it would be useful for me to return, given my strong transatlantic orientation and long‑standing support for Finland's NATO membership.

At home with your family, you mean?

Yes, with my wife, who is originally British and now a dual Finnish‑British citizen. We talked about whether I would do it if asked.

We had a plan that I could try to become a European Commissioner. But then Prime Minister Petteri Orpo asked me to run for President. We made the decision late, in August 2023. I honestly believe I would not be sitting in this chair were it not for Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.

You write in your book that a few days after the start of the war, you were in academia, as you said, but from your time as Foreign Minister, I assume you had Sergei Lavrov's phone number?

Indeed.

Why and what did you write to him?

Well, as I say in the book, I wrote him that — listen, this has gone too far, you are the only one that can stop him, it has to end. And of course, in a Sergey Lavrov kind of way, he came back. "Who do you mean, Biden or Zelenskyy?"

I think you even used some language like "It's madness"?

Yes, definitely. And then I had a long exchange by text message with him and realized that obviously he is going to play the Russian game because his phone is followed, etc. So yes, I tried from academia to have an impact, but it was too late.

You talk a lot about engagement, even with adversaries or competitors. Under which circumstances would you interact with Vladimir Putin?

As part of a bigger package would be my answer. And by that I mean to say that already for a couple of years, we have talked about when Europe should engage with the political leadership of Russia. I think we have had the wrong people knocking on the door. You know, the likes of Orbán or Fico. So there will come a moment, even though it might feel uncomfortable right now for many people, not only in Finland or in Estonia, where one, two or three European leaders will have to engage.

Will it be during this war? I do not know. Will it be after the war? Well, certainly. And right now we have to ask ourselves the question if America is more engaged with Iran and not engaged in the peace negotiations, would it be time for a European leader to engage Putin? That would then have to be very carefully coordinated.

So it is not like you call Putin bilaterally. You call Putin after you have clear instructions on what you are going to say from other European leaders. So I do not exclude that, but I do not have a date or a time for that.

What's your attitude towards the fact that you have been dubbed as a "Trump whisperer"?

(Laughing) My attitude is very Finnish, which is to say that I want to play it down. Because I'm very realistic. You know, President Trump is his own man. If I get one idea out of ten on the war in Ukraine into his ear, that's good. But I under no circumstance want to inflate my role. Sometimes I've been able to interpret Trump to Zelenskyy or Zelenskyy to Trump, and then both of them to, you know, European friends. I hope it's useful. I think for us small players, you know, information is power. So if I can give information to my European friends or to Zelenskyy about what I think Trump is thinking about then I think I'm useful to them. But for me to make a claim that I whisper into Trump's ear, do this and he does it? Exaggeration! Not happening.

Nonetheless, everyone remembers the golf. How did that happen?

Lindsey Graham. So Graham is a Senator from South Carolina. I studied at Furman University in South Carolina, and Graham came to visit early in my presidency before the U.S. elections in 2024. And he said — hey, let's, you know… I play a lot of golf with Trump, that if he becomes president, let's go and play.

And then we were sitting in the Munich Security Conference in 2025, in February right when Trump had been inaugurated. And Graham just called Trump and Trump answered and said — hey, I'm here with the president of Finland, he played golf for Furman. He was in the Finnish national team. Why don't we play at Mar-a-Lago? He said, yeah, great! Let's do it!

And then sure enough, at the end of March, a few weeks later, we ended up playing a round of golf, which obviously for the president of Finland to have breakfast, play golf, lunch, spend seven hours with the president of the U.S. is never a bad thing.

Did you realize at that time that it was nonetheless, or at least it appeared to be, something really extraordinary? It was a time when I think Trump had just begun his tariff war, he was threatening Greenland and when European capitals were calling, he didn't pick up the phone. And you got hours of his time?

 Oh, I think that's a little bit journalistic exaggeration. (Laughing) It's okay. But no, I mean, actually, Liberation Day was in early April, but he did call me a few days before that saying "Do you understand what I'm trying to do with the tariffs?"

I said, I understand you're weaponizing trade. I come from a small country. I disagree with your approach because I'm a free trader. "But if you do it, why don't you go instead for a fair and free trade agreement with Europe." So we had that conversation.

The Greenland threats had happened earlier. I think they were sort of hazy out there, but they happened seriously and in earnest in January 2026. So this year, and that's when I felt extremely uncomfortable. And that was probably the most difficult place that I've been in my time as president. At the time European leaders were engaging with Trump, you know, Macron had been there, Starmer had been there, Merz wasn't there yet. You know, Meloni. So we were all engaging. And I think there was a group of us that engaged a lot with Trump and, you know, still do.

But I didn't see the golf round as extraordinary. I just thought it was good for the president of Finland to have that connection and then relay some messages back. For instance, he asked me, can you trust Putin? I said, no, you can't.

What I'm trying to get at is that there are fewer and fewer people who feel that Donald Trump is playing some 3D chess, or there's a greater plan and more people who are feeling that his behavior is erratic, threatening Greenland, threatening to annihilate the civilization of Iran, and so forth. How do you cope with that? How should we cope with that?

So I think, you and I probably need to cope with it differently. You represent media freedom. You challenge, you question, you bring out what you think is good or what you think is bad. I'm the president of Finland. My job is to deal with the world as it is, not as I would wish it to be. And that also means that I have to take on things which I feel uncomfortable with.

I just mentioned the territorial claims on Greenland. And I have to think, okay, what can I do? So in Davos, you know, spoke a lot with Mark Rutte, many others and said, how do we get an off-ramp to de-escalate both the tariffs and the claims? And the off-ramp was: let's focus on Arctic security. So, yes, in foreign policy, it's kind of, every day comes a curveball at you. And of course, I don't deny it, with President Trump, there are quite a few curveballs. I mean, with his way of communication, he does rule the international media.

And then there are some things… How to cope with it, was your question. There are some things that I react to publicly. There are other things that I don't react to publicly, and there are some things that I react to and then convey those messages privately.

I have to ask, Donald Trump has been very critical of NATO, making all sorts of threats. How do you imagine NATO without the U.S.?

Well, I do not think it is going to happen. And, you know, from all the conversations that I have with my American friends — I was in the U.S. two weeks ago, I spent a lot of time with the U.S. military, with U.S. intelligence, with the members of the U.S. administration — I do not see it happening.

There will be a shift of the burden, especially on the conventional side, which I think is only fair. You know, we need to take more responsibility. I mean, I do not need to lecture Estonians about it with the levels that you have on defense spending as a percentage of GDP. So that shift is going to happen. But the U.S. is going to stay involved in NATO. It is still going to provide us with the nuclear umbrella. So let's just work pragmatically and leave the language aside.

I'd like to talk a few words about your relationship with Estonia. You were presented with your ancestral tree, reaching back many, many centuries, tracing it to people who lived in Estonia. Had you any idea previously?

I did, interestingly enough! Because I had participated in a program which is called Sukuni salat, so it's kind of the secrets of my ancestry.

And there was in the eighth direct line a musician who had been born in Estonia, but I didn't know the extent to which it was there. I mean, I did know about the Buttenhofs and Breitensteins a little bit from my father's side, but I didn't know that that lineage also was from my mother's side. And that was what took me by surprise.

By the way, I have that tree in my private office at my residence on the wall right behind my desk. So I'm very proud of my Estonian heritage.

This transcript has been edited for length and clarity.

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